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Abstract
We address the problem of deﬁning access control policies that may be used in the evaluation of requests
made by client actors, in the course of e-trading, to perform actions on the resources maintained by an e-
collective. An e-collective is a group of agents that may act individually or in conjunction with other agents
to satisfy a client’s request to act. Our principal contribution to this key problem is to deﬁne formally an
access control model in terms of which policies may be speciﬁed for helping to ensure that only legitimate
forms of client actions are performed in the course of engaging in e-trading. We call this model the action
control model. In action control, the notion of intentional, empowered, authorized actions, that may be
performed individually or jointly with other agents and in a manner that is consistent with a group ethos,
is the basis for specifying a set of permissives. A permissive is a generalization of the notion of permission
(as the latter term is usually interpreted in access control). We deﬁne our action control model as a term
rewrite system and we give examples of access policy representation.
Keywords: Access Control, Security, Term Rewriting.
1 Introduction
For many applications, existing access control models are suﬃcient for the limited
forms of actions that are required on simple object types (e.g., read and write actions
on ﬁles), which apply in the context of the restricted forms of organizations and
systems that are often assumed (cf. the Bell-LaPadula model [6]). Nevertheless,
there are organizational structures, emerging applications, new types of computer
systems, as well as complex forms of actions, that require that existing access control
models be extended and that novel access control models be developed to address
access control policy requirements adequately.
In this paper, we address the issue of formally deﬁning an access control model
for use for secure e-trading where (pre-authenticated) client agents make requests
for an action to be performed by a type of virtual organization that we call an
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e-collective. Informally, an e-collective is a collection of server agents that may
act individually to satisfy a client’s request that some action be performed or a
subset of the agents in the e-collective may act jointly in order to satisfy the client’s
request. For example, given a client request to buy 1000 green widgets, members of
the e-collective may oﬀer to service the client’s request in full or diﬀerent subsets of
the server agents of the e-collective may oﬀer to satisfy part of the client’s request.
This paper addresses the problem of formally specifying which client actions can be
performed by which server agents and in what ways.
For e-trading via e-collectives, a number of requirements exist. The client agents
and server agents will generally be widely distributed, the e-trading environment
will typically be highly dynamic (with trading conditions and policy requirements
changing frequently), server agents will maintain individual policies that need to be
combined to make collective decisions on access requests, and changes to policies
will usually need to be performed autonomously. Traditional access control models
often assume a single, monolithic policy speciﬁcation, that is managed by human
security administrators, that applies to a static, centralized organization with a
well-deﬁned set of users that request that simple forms of actions be performed on
simple forms of objects. Such assumptions, and the access control models on which
they are based, are inappropriate in the e-collective scenario.
For client request evaluation by e-collectives, server agent intentions and em-
powerments need to be considered, as well as authorizations. Put (very) simply,
an intention is a will to act; an empowerment is a capacity to act. In the case of
e-collectives, not all server agents will necessarily have the intention of satisfying all
client requests for all actions to be performed on every resource at all times and,
clearly, it will not be the case that all server agents will necessarily have the same
capability of satisfying a client’s request. More importantly, intentions, empower-
ments and authorizations are fundamentally and mutually dependent on whether
the server agents act individually or collectively to satisfy a client agent’s request.
For instance, e-collective server agents might not be empowered to act individually
to satisfy a client’s request but may be empowered to act jointly with other servers
to satisfy the request, not every server agent will necessarily have the intention of
acting individually or engaging jointly to satisfy every client’s request that some
action be performed, and what a server agent authorizes may depend on whether
it acts with other server agents or not. The importance of combining intentions,
empowerments and authorizations for request evaluation for e-collectives has not
hitherto been adequately considered in the literature on access control models. In
addressing this shortcoming, we propose a new type of access control model, which
we call the action control model.
For the formal deﬁnition of the action control model, we use term rewrit-
ing [1,12,19]. Term rewriting has a number of speciﬁc attractions for representing
access control policies, as described in [5,8,29]. In particular, standard rewriting
techniques and modularity results for rewriting systems can be used to show that
access control policies satisfy essential properties (such as consistency and total-
ity), and programming languages and tools such as ELAN [10,18], MAUDE [11],
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Haskell [16] and ML [26], can be used to test, compare and experiment with eval-
uation strategies, to automate equational reasoning, and for the rapid prototyping
of policies. As we will see, action control generalizes access control. The extra
complexities involved in specifying action control polices demand that high-level,
declarative languages be used for policy speciﬁcation, languages like those based
on term rewriting. Moreover, recursive rule deﬁnition is particularly important in
client request evaluation. For action control for e-collectives, the distributed term
rewriting systems that we use are especially well-suited.
For the actions of relevance in e-trading (e.g., acts of buying, supplying, . . . ),
we argue that action control requires that intentions and empowerments to act
need to be considered as well as authorizations to act. The authorization of a
requested action by the client agent becomes meaningful if and only if an intention to
perform the action and an empowerment to so act exist for a server agent. Intentions
and empowerments may be interpreted as preconditions for authorization. In the
existing access control literature, a permission is a pair (a, r), where a is an action
and r is a resource, and an authorization is a permission assigned to a client user. In
contrast, in action control, a generalization of a permission is used, which we call a
permissive. A permissive represents an optional, authorized, intentional, empowered
action.
Permissives are, as we have said, fundamentally related to the mode in which a
server agent acts, individually or collectively. When a server agent of an e-collective
acts individually to satisfy a client’s request then we say that the server agent acts
in I-mode; when an server agent must collaborate with other server agents in the
e-collective to satisfy a client’s request (with each server agent contributing to the
satisfaction of the request) then we say that the server agent acts in C-mode. 2
The distinction between I-mode and C-mode motivates the need for a shared meta-
policy that determines how server agents may act individually or collectively to
service client agent requests and to what extent. For that, the notion of a group
ethos is used in action control. In the C-mode case, a request by a client agent for
an action to be performed may be satisﬁed by the server agents of the e-collective
subdividing the request and satisfying part of the original request. In order for a
permissive to hold in I-mode or C-mode the permissive must be consistent with the
group ethos.
Despite being thus far relatively neglected, it is important for researchers to
consider the range of access control issues that relate to e-collectives used for e-
trading. For a number of reasons, if adequate access controls can be provided, e-
collectives will become routinely used in, for example, grid computing, as a form of
virtual organization, and in the context of Internet and Semantic Web technologies.
As an e-collective, a group of server agents may be able to pool their resources
to compete for a contract that none of them could individually satisfy, they may
choose to subcontract a client’s request for business reasons, and collections of server
agents may decide to collaborate in order to combine their individual strengths and
specializations.
2 Our use of I-mode and C-mode actions is based on Tuomela’s theory of cooperation [32].
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The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 describes
some formal preliminaries. In Section 3, we deﬁne our action control model as a
term rewriting system and we give examples of policy usage and secure request
evaluation. Section 4 discusses how some properties of action control policies, such
as consistency, can be obtained using term rewriting techniques. In Section 5, we
discuss the related literature more fully. In Section 6, conclusions are drawn and
further work is suggested.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we recall some basic notions and notations for term rewriting that we
will use in the rest of the paper. We refer the reader to [1] for additional information.
A signature F is a ﬁnite set of function symbols together with their (ﬁxed) arity.
X denotes a denumerable set of variables X1,X2, . . ., and T (F ,X ) denotes the set
of terms built up from F and X . Terms are identiﬁed with ﬁnite labeled trees.
The symbol at the root of t is denoted by root(t). Positions are strings of positive
integers. The subterm of t at position p is denoted by t|p and the result of replacing
t|p with u at position p in t is denoted by t[u]p.
V(t) denotes the set of variables occurring in t. A term is linear if variables
in V(t) occur at most once in t. A term is ground if V(t) = ∅. Substitutions are
written as in {X1 → t1, . . . ,Xn → tn} where ti is assumed to be diﬀerent from the
variable Xi. We use Greek letters for substitutions and postﬁx notation for their
application. We say that two terms unify if there is some substitution that makes
them equal. Such a substitution is called a uniﬁer. The most general uniﬁer (mgu)
is the uniﬁer that will yield instances in the most general form.
Given a signature F , a term rewriting system on F is a set of rewrite rules
R = {li → ri}i∈I , where li, ri ∈ T (F ,X ), li ∈ X , and V(ri) ⊆ V(li). A term
t rewrites to a term u at position p with the rule l → r and the substitution σ,
written t →l→rp u, or simply t →R u, if t|p = lσ and u = t[rσ]p. Such a term t is
called reducible. Irreducible terms are said to be in normal form.
We denote by →+R (resp. →
∗
R) the transitive (resp. transitive and reﬂexive) clo-
sure of the rewrite relation →R. The subindex R will be omitted when it is clear
from the context.
Example 2.1 Consider a signature for lists of natural numbers, with function sym-
bols:
• z (with arity 0) and s (with arity 1, denoting the successor function) to build
numbers;
• nil (with arity 0, to denote an empty list), cons (with arity 2, to construct non-
empty lists), and length (with arity 1, to compute the length of a list).
The list containing the numbers 0 and 1 is written: cons(z, cons(s(z), nil)), or simply
[z, s(z)] for short. We can specify the function length with rewrite rules as follows:
length(nil) → z length(cons(X,L)) → s(length(L))
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Then we have a reduction sequence:
length(cons(z, cons(s(z), nil)))→ s(length(cons(s(z), nil))→ s(s(length(nil)))→ s(s(z))
Example 2.2 Boolean operators, such as disjunction and conjunction, can be spec-
iﬁed using a signature that includes two constants, true and false.
or(true,X) → true and(true,X) → X
or(false,X) → X and(false,X) → false
In the sequel we use the notation t1 and . . . and tn as syntactic sugar for the term
and(. . . and(and(t1, t2), t3) . . .), and similarly for the or operator.
Let l → r and s → t be two rewrite rules (we assume that the variables of
s → t were renamed so that there is no common variable with l → r), p the position
of a non-variable subterm of s, and μ a most general uniﬁer of s|p and l. Then
(tμ, sμ[rμ]p) is a critical pair formed from those rules. Note that s → t may be a
renamed version of l → r. In this case a superposition at the root position is not
considered a critical pair. A term rewriting system R is:
• conﬂuent if for all terms t, u, v: t →∗ u and t →∗ v implies u →∗ s and v →∗ s,
for some s;
• terminating (or strongly normalizing) if all reduction sequences are ﬁnite;
• left-linear if all left-hand sides of rules in R are linear;
• non-overlapping if there are no critical pairs;
• orthogonal if R is left-linear and non-overlapping;
For example, the rewrite system in Example 2.1 is left-linear and non-overlapping
(therefore orthogonal), conﬂuent and terminating.
Action control policies are applicable in distributed computing contexts. For
that, we will use distributed term rewriting systems (DTRSs); DTRSs are term
rewriting systems where rules are partitioned into modules, each associated with a
site, and function symbols are annotated with site identiﬁers. DTRSs were intro-
duced in [8] to specify access control policies in a dynamic, distributed environment.
We assume that each site has a unique identiﬁer (we use Greek letters μ, ν, . . .
to denote site identiﬁers). We say that a rule f(t1, . . . , tn) → r deﬁnes f . There
may be several rules deﬁning f ; we write fν to refer to the deﬁnition of the function
symbol f stored in the site ν. If a symbol is used in a rule without a site annotation
then we assume the function is deﬁned locally. For example, in a DTRS used in a
bank scenario, we may have a local function account such that account(u) returns u’s
bank account number, and rules computing the average balance of a user’s account,
stored in a site ν. Then we could deﬁne the category of a user u by using a rule of
the form
category(U) → if averagebalanceν(account(U)) ≥ 10000
then VIP else NORMALCLIENT
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We use the notation if b then s else t as syntactic sugar for the term
if-then-else(b, s, t), with the rewrite rules:
if-then-else(true,X, Y )→ X if-then-else(false,X, Y )→ Y
In this paper, we assume that the site where each function is deﬁned is known
and therefore the annotations used in function symbols are just constants. More
general versions (where, for instance, variables can be used as annotations when
sites are not known in advance), may also be used.
3 The Action Control Model by Term Rewriting
In this section, we formally deﬁne the action control model. We consider some basic
syntactic issues, we then give and justify the inclusion of the core set of rewrite rules
that deﬁne the action control model, we give examples of policy speciﬁcation, in
terms of the model, and we consider client request evaluation.
On syntax, we ﬁrst note the key sets of constants in the signature that we use
in the formulation of the action control model and policies. Speciﬁcally, we require:
• A countable set C of client identiﬁers, c0, c1, . . .
• A countable set M of identiﬁers, m0,m1, . . . of server agents that are members
of an e-collective.
• A countable set A of named actions (represented by strings that denote actions
in a world of interest e.g., buy, sell, supply, hire, . . . ).
• A countable set R of resource identiﬁers, r, r1, . . .
• A countable set T of time points, t, t1, . . .
Here, we have that C ∩ M = ∅ holds for a particular instance of an e-collective.
We include times with our speciﬁcations of action control policies because intentions,
empowerments, and authorizations will inevitably change, and often in a highly
dynamic manner. We adopt a one-dimensional, linear, discrete view of time, with a
beginning and no end point, i.e., a total ordering of time points that is isomorphic
to the natural numbers. In the ensuing discussion, we represent times as encoded
natural numbers in Y Y Y Y MMDD format. We assume the existence of a function
that extracts the current time from the system clock.
Recall that we are proposing an interpretation of access control in which in-
tentions, empowerments and authorizations are necessary in order for a permissive
to hold. It follows that an action control theory is a 4-tuple consisting of a set
of permissives and three subtheories, in terms of which the set of permissives is
deﬁned,
(PER,INT , EMP,AUT H).
Here, PER is the set of rules that is used to deﬁne the set of permissives, INT
is a theory of intentions that individual agents within the e-collective have to act
(in I-mode and C-mode), EMP is a theory that speciﬁes whether an agent in the e-
collective is empowered to act according to the group ethos (in I-mode or C-mode),
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and AUT H is a theory that deﬁnes the actions that members of the e-collective
authorize client agents to perform on resources (in I-mode or C-mode) that are
maintained by the e-collective.
The examples of action control policy formulation that we will give, later in
this section, relate to a simple e-commerce application. Speciﬁcally, we assume an
e-collective with four members that are identiﬁed by m1, m2, m3 and m4. We make
the simplifying assumptions that the only resource of interest to client agents is a
set of parts and the only action of interest is an act of buying. Each member of an
e-collective that has an intention of satisfying a client’s request to buy some part
will maintain its own information about the set of parts at its local site. We assume
each part is identiﬁed by a name (widget, bauble, etc) and that client requests are
to buy a quantity of a speciﬁed part. The binary constructor part is used to specify
a part p and its quantity q.
Given an action control policy speciﬁcation, a client c0 may make a request of
the form:
permissive(c0, buy, part(widget, 1300),m1).
That is, c0’s request is to know whether it is permitted to buy 1300 units worth
of the widget part from the agent m1. On receiving c0’s request, the agent m1
will evaluate the request with respect to its own declarations of permissives and
may request other e-collective members to cooperate with it to jointly satisfy c0’s
request.
Our examples will also involve considering application-speciﬁc information about
the stock levels of various parts held by the e-collective agents m1, m2, m3 and m4
and stored in sites identiﬁed by υ1, υ2, υ3 and υ4, respectively, viz:{
stockυ1(widget) → 200, stockυ1(bauble) → 300, . . .
{
stockυ2(widget) → 100, stockυ2(bauble) → 300, . . .{
stockυ3(widget) → 800, stockυ3(bauble) → 100, . . .{
stockυ4(widget) → 150, stockυ4(bauble) → 200, . . .
Here, stockυi(r) → q iﬀ the e-collective member mi (1 ≤ i ≤ 4) has the quantity
q of the item of type r available in stock. 3
3.1 PER Theory
The PER sub-theory consists of the following rules, which deﬁne permissives for
each member m of the e-collective using a 4-ary function permissive. To specify the
function permissive we use the functions i permissiveν and c permissiveμ, where
ν, μ are the sites that store the action control policy for m, expressed in individual
and collective mode, respectively. We deﬁne i permissiveν , c permissiveμ and
3 We assume that the stock information used by diﬀerent e-collective members is of the same format, but
this need not, of course, be the case.
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permissive for each agent in the e-collective. These core rules are deﬁned in the
following way:
permissive(C,A,R,m) → i permissiveν(C,A,R) or c permissiveμ(C,A,R)
i permissiveν(C,A,R) → F (i empoweredν(C,A,R), i intentν(C,A,R),
i authorizedν(C,A,R))
c permissiveμ(C,A,R) → G(c empoweredμ(C,A,R), c intentμ(C,A,R),
c authorizedμ(C,A,R))
According to the rules above, when a client c requests a member m of the e-collective
to perform the action a on resource r, the agent m has the option to act in I-mode
or C-mode to satisfy the request. In the rules above, i permissiveν , i intentν
and i authorizedν are functions returning boolean values. The functions F and G
are parameters of the speciﬁcation. They may simply be a conjunction operator,
or we may have additional conditions that need to be veriﬁed in order to deﬁne
i permissiveν and c permissiveμ. If we assume that F and G are simply computing
a conjunction, then the rule deﬁning i permissive speciﬁes that client c’s request
to perform the a action on resource r is satisﬁed by the e-collective agent m acting
in I-mode if m has the intention of performing the action a on the resource r, in I-
mode, m is empowered, in I-mode, to perform the action a on r, and m authorizes
the client c to perform the action a in I-mode. Thus, we might have, for example,
the following reduction:
i permissiveν(c, a, r) → and(i empoweredν(c, a, r), i intentν(c, a, r),
i authorizedν(c, a, r))
→ and(true, true, true) → true
Similarly, the c permissive rule speciﬁes that client c’s request to perform the
a action on resource r is satisﬁed by the e-collective agent m acting in C-mode if
m has the intention of performing the action a on the resource r, in C-mode, m
is empowered, in C-mode, to perform the action a on r, and m authorizes c, in C-
mode, c’s requested action. We consider the representation of theories of intentions,
empowerments and authorizations next.
3.2 INT Theory
Each server agent of the e-collective will maintain its own intention theory INT .
INT is a set of rules that deﬁne agent m’s intentions in terms of an action a that
m is willing to engage in on resource r, in I-mode, on client c’s behalf (the i intent
rules), and m’s intentions in terms of an action a that m is willing to engage in on
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resource r, in C-mode, on c’s behalf (the c intent rules):
i intent(C,A,R) → C1 and . . . and Cn
c intent(C,A,R) → C1 and . . . and Ck
The rules above (where site annotations have been omitted) specify that the e-
collective agent m has an intention to perform an action a on resource r in I-mode
(C-mode) on behalf of client c if the conditions, C1σ, . . . , Cnσ (C1σ, . . . , Ckσ) hold,
where σ = {C → c,A → a,R → r}. The example that follows next illustrates what
is involved in specifying server agent intentions as a term rewriting systems.
Example 3.1 Consider the following set of intention theories INTm1, INTm2,
INTm3, and INTm4, for the e-collective members m1, m2, m3 and m4:
INTm1 :=
{
i intentν((C, buy, part(X,Z)) → true
c intentμ((C, buy, part(X,Z)) → Z > 1000
INTm2 :=
{
i intentα(C, buy, part(widget, Z)) → Z ≤ 1000
c intentτ (C, buy, part(bauble, Z)) → Z ≥ 50
INTm3 :=
{
i intentπ(C,A,R) → preferred(C)
INTm4 :=
{
i intentγ(C,A,R) → current time ≥ 20080601
c intentδ(C,A,R) → current time ≥ 20081001
Here, INTm1 is a speciﬁcation of the intentions that the e-collective member m1
has of satisfying any client’s request to perform an act of buying in I-mode or in
C-mode provided that the total size of the order (in the latter case) is greater than
1000 units. INTm2 expresses m2’s intention to act individually to satisfy a request
from any client to buy if the request is for less than 1000 widgets; m2 is also willing
to act in C-mode to satisfy requests for sales of more than 50 units worth of baubles.
INTm3 expresses that m3 is willing to satisfy any action on any resource without
restriction, but only in I-mode and only for the clients that it identiﬁes as preferred.
Finally, INTm4 speciﬁes that m4 is willing to satisfy any action requested by any
client on any resource in I-mode as soon as m4 starts trading on 1st June 2008 and
will act in C-mode four months after starting to trade.
3.3 EMP Theory
In addition to its intentions, each server member of the e-collective will maintain
its own EMP theory, a speciﬁcation of its empowerments. An EMP theory, is a
set of rules of the form:
i empowered(C,A,R) → C1 and . . . and Cn
c empowered(C,A,R) → C1 and . . . and Ck
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Each i empowered (c empowered) rule speciﬁes that an agent m is empowered to
perform the a action on resource r for client c in I-mode (C-mode) if the conjunction
of conditions C1, . . . , Cn (C1, . . . , Ck) hold. In the case of C-mode evaluation, at
least one Ci (1 ≤ i ≤ k) should be expressed in terms of c permissive. The
reason for this should be noted: in the case of C-mode evaluation, the evaluation
of c empowered(C,A,R) involves a member m of the e-collective requesting the
collaboration of other agents in the e-collective in satisfying the request that an a
action be performed in relation to resource r on behalf of the client c. Hence, a
c permissive condition in a c empowered rule is a recursive call that will trigger the
evaluation of a request by a set of members of the e-collective, that will collaborate
with m to satisfy the request by c to perform the action a on r. For example, we
might have a reduction:
c empoweredμ(c, a, r) → c1(a) and c permissiveτ (c, a, r) → true and true → true
Hence, when m acts in C-mode according to the policy speciﬁed in site μ, then m
acts jointly with other e-collective members if and only if there is some e-collective
agent m′ = m (whose action control policy is stored in site τ) that has an intention
and is empowered and authorized to act with m to satisfy a client’s request.
To treat adequately the concept of empowerment in action control for e-
collectives, the notion of a group ethos is required. The group ethos determines
what powers member agents can exercise in the context of the e-collective. To aid
the reader’s understanding of this key issue, we describe a simple form of group
ethos such that an e-collective member m acts to satisfy a request from a client
c in full by m operating alone whenever that is consistent with m’s speciﬁcations
of intentions, empowerments and authorizations. If m has an intention to act but
is not empowered to act then m will request other agents of the e-collective to
help in satisfying c’s request. Hence, each member of the e-collective will act in
I-mode if possible and in C-mode otherwise. Despite its simplicity, this group ethos
is consistent with the concept of prospective rationality that is deﬁned within the
framework of Rational Choice [22]. Henceforth, we will call the shared ethos such
that e-collective members act to their maximum intended, empowered and autho-
rized extent to satisfy a client’s request in I-mode, whenever that is possible, the
Principle of Maximal Individualistic Satisfaction, to wit:
If an e-collective member m intends and can fully satisfy a request of a client c for
an action to be performed that m authorizes for c then m will act in an I-mode
capacity (i.e., privately, selﬁshly) subject to any constraints on I-mode action
(conversely, m has the minimal commitment to act collectively). Otherwise, m
determines the maximal extent to which it can satisfy the request by c, and will
request help from other members of the e-collective on how to satisfy the remainder
of c’s request. In this case, the C-mode case, m invites members of the e-collective
to engage in joint activity to satisfy c’s request.
Acting as a member agent entails respecting the Principle of Maximal Individ-
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ualistic Satisfaction, the shared group ethos. Other forms of group ethos are, of
course, possible (e.g., to allow for group competitiveness, altruism, etc); these alter-
natives are the basis for diﬀerent e-collective meta-policies that can, nevertheless,
be naturally represented in our framework.
The next example illustrates how empowerment theories may be represented as
a TRS.
Example 3.2 Consider the following empowerment theories EMPm1 , EMPm2 ,
EMPm3 , and EMPm4 , for the e-collective members m1, m2, m3 and m4, respec-
tively. The empowerment theories assume that the Principle of Maximal Satisfac-




i empoweredν(C, buy, part(X,Z)) → stockυ1(X) ≥ Z
c empoweredμ(C, buy, part(X,Z)) → stockυ1(X) < Z and




i empoweredα(C, buy, part(X,Z)) →
month(current time) > 6 and
stockυ2(X) > Z and Z ≤ 500
c empoweredτ (C, buy, part(X,Z)) → Z ≥ 500 and
c permissiveδ(C, buy, part(X,Z − stockυ2(X)))
EMPm3 :=
{




i empoweredγ(C, buy, part(X,Z)) → stockυ4(X) ≥ Z
c empoweredδ(C, buy, part(X,Z)) → stockυ4(X) < Z and
c permissiveμ(C, buy, part(X,Z − stockυ4(X)))
Here, the agent m1 will act in I-mode for any client c if m1 is empowered to
so act by having enough stock, as recorded in υ1, to satisfy c’s request to perform
an act of buying. Alternatively, if m1 cannot satisfy the request itself then m1
will attempt to act in C-mode, with another member of the e-collective, to service
c’s request. That is, m1 will adhere to the Principle of Maximal Individualistic
Satisfaction and satisfy whatever it can of c’s request and then ask for assistance
with the remainder. In contrast, m2 is only empowered to act in I-mode if it
has enough stock as recorded in υ2, subject to certain temporal constraints being
satisﬁed, and for orders of less than 500 units. In the case where a request is to
buy more than 500 units, m2 will act in C-mode but by requesting help from δ, to
which m2 subcontracts “large” orders. Furthermore, while m2 is willing to supply
any client, m3 is only empowered to supply c0 and in I-mode. Similarly to m1,
m4 is only empowered to act in I-mode if it has enough stock, otherwise it will act
in C-mode and ask for the collaboration of another member of the e-collective for
satisfying the client’s request.
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3.4 AUT H Theory
In addition to an INT theory and an EMP theory, each agent m in the e-collective
will deﬁne an AUT H theory. An AUT H theory is a set of rules for specifying
whether m authorizes a client c to perform an action a on a resource r when m
is acting in I-mode or C-mode. The speciﬁcation of the authorization policy may
follow any of the standard access control models. For instance, we may specify a
role-based authorization policy. We omit the details of the access control model
(see for instance [5] for a rewrite-based speciﬁcation of the RBAC model) and just
show the general form of the rules:
i authorized(C,A,R) → ρi
c authorized(C,A,R) → ρc
where ρi and ρc are suitable right-hand sides (depending on the policy to be mod-
eled). Therefore, the term i authorized(c, a, r) (or c authorized(c, a, r)) is evalu-
ated using the rewrite rules deﬁning the chosen access control policy and gives as
a result a permission or a denial, denoted by true and false respectively, for client
agent c’s request to perform an action a on resource r.
An example of an AUT H subtheory, represented as a TRS, follows next.
Example 3.3 For the authorization subtheory that is used in our running example,
we make the simplifying assumption that all members of the e-collective use the
same RBAC authorization theory, which includes the following deﬁnitions:
i authorized(C,A,R) → check(member((A,R), privileges(roles(C))))
c authorized(C,A,R) → check(member((A,R), privileges(roles(C))))
roles(c0) → [r01, . . . , r1i] . . . roles(cn) → [rn1, . . . , rnk]
priv(r0) → [(a01, o11), . . . , (a1i, o1i)] . . . priv(rn) → [(an1, on1), . . . , (ank, onk)]
privileges(nil) → nil
privileges(cons(R,L)) → priv(R) ∪ privileges(L)
In this example, a client agent C is authorized by an e-collective member to
perform the A action on resource R, in I-mode or C-mode, if C is assigned to a role
R′ and the A privilege on R is assigned to R′. For example, given the rules
roles(c0) → [specialClient]
priv(specialClient) → [(buy, part(widget, 1300)), . . .]
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we have
i authorized(c0, buy, part(widget, 1300)) →
check(member((buy, part(widget, 1300)), privileges(roles(c0)))) →
check(member((buy, part(widget, 1300)), privileges([specialClient]))) →∗ true
Any number of authorization theories can, of course, be deﬁned (for the I-mode
and the C-mode cases), but the simple authorization theory above is suﬃcient for
understanding what is involved in specifying AUT H subtheories in action control.
3.5 Client Request Evaluation
We show next an evaluation example, using the setting and the theories presented
in Examples 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3.
Example 3.4 Let us consider the request permissive(c0, buy, part(widget, 1300),m1).
From the previous discussion and using the examples of policy formulation that we
have developed, we have the reduction
permissive(c0, buy, part(widget, 1300),m1) →
i permissiveν(c0, buy, part(widget, 1300)) or c permissiveμ(c0, buy, part(widget, 1300))
The ﬁrst term in the disjunction, corresponding to an action performed in I-mode,
leads to the result
and(i empoweredν(c0, buy, part(widget, 1300)), i intentν(c0, buy, part(widget, 1300)),
i authorizedν(c0, buy, part(widget, 1300))) →
∗ and(false, true, true) → false
since the stock provision (200 widgets) associated with member m1 is not suﬃcient
to satisfy the client’s request.
The second term in the disjunction, corresponding to an action performed in
C-mode, leads instead to the result
and(c empoweredμ(c0, buy, part(widget, 1300)), c intentμ(c0, buy, part(widget, 1300)),
c authorizedμ(c0, buy, part(widget, 1300))) →
∗ and(true, true, true) → true
assuming c permissiveτ (c0, buy, part(widget, 1100)) holds, i.e., another member at
site τ is able to provide the remaining 1100 widgets. Therefore
permissive(c0, buy, part(widget, 300),m1) → true
In conclusion, the client’s demand cannot be treated by member m1 in isolation,
but can be satisﬁed if other members of the e-collective collaborate with member
m1, in a way allowed by the action control policy.
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4 Properties of Action Control Policies
As in the case of access control, action control policies should satisfy certain criteria
in order to be “acceptable”. For instance, it may be necessary to ensure that an
action control policy formulation does not specify that any client is granted and
denied the same request to the same agent at the same moment in time (i.e., that
the policy is consistent). More precisely, we are interested in the following properties
of action control policies:
Totality : Each request from a valid client c to a valid agent in the e-collective
to perform a valid action a on the resource r receives as answer. Answers can be: a
permission, a denial, or undeterminate (i.e., any result that is neither true nor false
will be interpreted as undeterminate).
Consistency : For any c ∈ C, a ∈ A, r ∈ R, and m ∈ M it is not possible to
derive more than one result for a request from c to m to perform the action a on
r. In other words, at most one of the results true, false or undeterminate is possible
for each request.
Totality and consistency can be ensured, for policies deﬁned as term rewriting
systems, by checking that the rewrite relation is conﬂuent and terminating. Ter-
mination ensures that all requests produce a result (their evaluation cannot get
“stuck”) and conﬂuence ensures that results are unique.
A stronger version of totality, requiring that the policy always produces an
answer which is true or false (i.e., no undeterminate results) is desirable for some
applications. In order to prove that a policy is total in this sense, a characterisation
of normal forms is needed. Suﬃcient completeness is a useful property in this case
(see [29]).
Termination and conﬂuence of term rewriting systems are undecidable properties
in general, but there is an extensive body of work aimed at providing decidable suf-
ﬁcient conditions for conﬂuence and termination (see, for example, [20,25,24,3,2,9]).
In particular, orthogonal systems are conﬂuent, and systems that deﬁne recursive
functions using a primitive recursive scheme are terminating. These conditions have
been used in [5] to derive suﬃcient conditions for totality and conﬂuence of access
control policies, and the same techniques can be used for action control policies.
For example, it is easy to show that the rewrite system deﬁned by the rules given
in the examples in the previous section is conﬂuent (even if some of the rules are not
completely speciﬁed) because all left-hand sides are left-linear and non-overlapping
(i.e., the rewrite system is orthogonal [20]). As a consequence:
Proposition 4.1 The action control policy for the e-commerce application speciﬁed
by the rewrite rules in Section 3 is consistent.
5 Related Work
Access control requirements for e-trading via e-collectives are not well served by
existing models. Traditional access control models, like access control matrices [21],
are only suitable as authorization models for actions performed by individual agents
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within the context of static systems; they are not appropriate in the case of dynamic,
e-trading via e-collectives.
In [27], an approach for controlled collaboration via the editing of data struc-
tures is proposed. The work is based on notions from RBAC and a collection of
“collaboration rights”. In contrast, the action control model focuses on arbitrary
actions and a conception of collaboration that is very diﬀerent from that described
in [27]. In [33], some primitive concepts that relate to the authorization of joint
actions are discussed and are of relevance to the notion of cooperative action that
we have considered. However, the work in [33] is based on a diﬀerent conception
of collective action than the one that we adopt and, unlike action control, there is
no discussion of any formal aspects of joint action and no formal security model is
proposed.
In principle, standard RBAC models [14] do, permit requested actions on re-
sources to be of arbitrary complexity, but the support for arbitrariness is facilitated
by RBAC’s (generally) restricted notion of authorization. In the standard deﬁni-
tion of authorization in RBAC (omitting considerations of sessions), an action a is
allowed on resource r iﬀ a client c is assigned to a role to which the permission (a, r)
has been assigned. In RBAC, a can be of arbitrary complexity and so the deﬁnitions
of authorizations can be used to evaluate “Can I perform action a?” requests where
a “yes” answer is rendered if c is authorized to perform a. However, for actions
like buying, a “yes” response requires more than simply an authorization; a “yes”
response for an act of buying only makes sense if there is a seller that has the inten-
tion of allowing c to buy and the power to sell to c. In action control, permissives
are a generalization of the concept of authorization.
Work on Context-TBAC (C-TBAC) [15] is related to our action control model, it
being concerned with access control in collaborative environments and the context in
which access control requirements are deﬁned. However, in the action control model,
unlike C-TBAC, intention policies and empowerment policies are fundamentally
important and are used as standard types of contexts. Work on TeaM-based Access
Control [30] is also related to ours in the sense that collaborative activity may
be engaged in by a “team” of agents to satisfy some goal (i.e., C-mode action).
However, the work on TMAC has been largely based on integrating TMAC with
RBAC. More recently, a locale-based access control (LBAC) model [31] has been
described that exhibits similarities to action control. However, LBAC is concerned
with an speciﬁc enhancement of RBAC to take into account the context in which
roles may be activated. None of C-TBAC, TMAC and LBAC make the distinction
between I-mode and C-mode evaluation, identify the importance of a group ethos
or use permissives for the rich forms of access control policies that are required in
e-trading via e-collectives.
On the issue of context in access control, we also note that there are several con-
tributions to the literature on representing contexts via rule-based speciﬁcations of
conditional access control requirements (see, for example, [7], [17] and [4]). More-
over, XACML [23] may be used to express some quite general requirements for
access control. In contrast to these approaches, the action control model is very
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speciﬁc about the types of rules that are to be admitted for deﬁning permissives; ad
hoc rules for specifying intentions, empowerments and authorizations are not sim-
ply to be included in policy speciﬁcations (for e-collectives) as “side-conditions”.
Moreover, it is the emphasis on individual and collective acting in e-collectives that
makes intentions, empowerments and a group ethos important, as well as autho-
rizations, for action control. Rule-based approaches have thus far been not applied
in cases where these notions emerge as being important to treat.
On access control by term rewriting, we note that [5,28,8] use term rewrite
rules to represent access control policies. Our work diﬀers from this literature in
the sense that we have used term rewriting to deﬁne a new type of access control
model, the action control model, which is intended for use for access control for
a type of organization (e-collectives) to which standard assumptions do not apply
(e.g., the assumption of centralized organizations to which static forms of access
policies relate to simple forms of actions on simple types of objects). The work
on “policy composition” by term rewriting by Dougherty et al [13] bears some
similarity to ours. In Dougherty et al.’s work, the problem of resolving conﬂicts
when combining access control policies is addressed. In contrast, our concern is
with combining action control policies that deﬁne intentions, empowerments and
authorizations and thus permissives that are used to deﬁne allowed forms of action
requests.
6 Conclusions and Further Work
We have addressed the (open) problem of deﬁning permitted forms of complex,
requested actions (like buying) that are used by agents acting individually or col-
laboratively as part of an e-collective to evaluate client user requests. On that, our
principal contribution has been to formally deﬁne an action control model in terms
of which permissives may be speciﬁed: intentional, empowered authorized actions
that may be performed individually (in I-mode) or jointly (in C-mode) and that are
consistent with the shared ethos of an e-collective. To the best of our knowledge, no
access control model has thus far been proposed that combines these concepts, that
grounds them in an adequate theory of cooperation (cf. our use of [32]), and that is
formally well-deﬁned (cf. our use of term rewriting). For the formal speciﬁcation,
we have deﬁned our action control model as a term rewrite system. Represented
as a TRS, the action control model: enables changes to access control policies to
be eﬀected dynamically and autonomously; makes it possible to treat individual-
istic and joint actions and the combining of multiple e-collectives in a completely
uniform manner (in both cases, by exploiting the recursion, which TRSs provide);
and permits properties of policies to be deﬁned and proven for assurance purposes.
Moreover, despite the complexities involved in formulation, action control policies
can be straightforwardly speciﬁed as a TRS.
To simplify the discussion in this paper, we have described the action control
model in terms of a basic form of group ethos and we have used simple intention,
empowerment and authorization theories in our examples. It must be noted, how-
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ever, that many forms of ethos and more complex forms of action control policies
can be naturally accommodated in the action control model and can be represented
as term rewrite systems. In future work, we plan to consider other forms of group
ethos and their representation as TRSs; we also intend to consider an enhanced
form of the action control model on which constraints may be expressed to capture
higher-level access control policy requirements.
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